Presentism, Atemporality, and Time\u27s Way by Leftow, Brian
PRESENTISM, ATEMPORALITY, AND TIME’S WAY
Brian Leftow
After defining presentism, I consider four arguments that presentism and di-
vine atemporality are incompatible. I identify an assumption common to the 
four, ask what reason there is to consider it true, and argue against it.
Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas, and hosts of lesser lights shared a pair of 
metaphysical views. They were presentists, holding that always, the 
present is all there is to time—that nothing ever has past or future parts.1 
They also held that God exists atemporally. Some recent authors argue that 
presentism and divine atemporality (hereafter DA) are incompatible; many 
more seem to suspect it. I now briefly discuss presentism, then present four 
arguments for the incompatibility and identify an assumption they share: 
that the way things are for things in time is the way they are for God. I then 
ask why we should think this assumption true and argue against it.
Two Forms of Presentism
One sort of presentism—call it “universal presentism”—is a bit hard 
to formulate. Universal presentists want to assert something like the 
following: only present things ever exist. Many state their view as the fol-
lowing claim:
Always, everything that exists or occurs is temporally present.2
But this statement won’t do if universal presentism is to be a substan-
tive thesis. For “exists” and “occurs” are present-tensed. So this amounts 
to the claim that always, everything that presently exists or occurs is 
temporally present: it is a tautology.3 Presentists need their view to be 
1Though of course many things have had parts which used to exist or occur and now do not, 
and will have parts they now do not.
2For this sort of definition see Callender, “Introduction”; Hare, On Myself, 17; Sider, 
“Presentism and Ontological Commitment,” 325; Bigelow, “Presentism and Properties,” 353; 
Crisp, “Presentism,” 215; Markosian, “A Defence of Presentism,” 47n1.
3Some argue that every way to state presentism is either clearly false or a tautology 
(see, e.g., Meyer, The Nature of Time). If the first, presentism poses no problem for DA. If the 
second, those who argue that DA and presentism are incompatible should recant, because 
they concede that God could have been atemporal (so, e.g., Padgett, God, Eternity and the 
Nature of Time; Craig, God, Time and Eternity), and a tautology is compatible with everything 
possibly true. So while I try below to state presentism in ways that are non—tautologous and 
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non-tautologous, for they claim that presentism is incompatible with 
present, past and future being equally real. But whatever presently exists 
is temporally present even if present, past, and future are equally real. 
Again, a tautology is compatible with everything possibly true, and it is at 
least possibly true that present, past, and future are equally real. For there 
could have been only something timeless. For instance, there could have 
been only a three-dimensional absolute space. It is just not a necessary 
truth that space coexists with time, or is melded with it in a space-time 
continuum. Again, here is a reasonable set of claims:
There was a Big Bang singularity. It was not part of time. It was instead 
the boundary time approaches pastward. It did not have to erupt; it 
could have just sat there.
There could have been a non-temporal singularity that did not explode. 
Had there been one, there would have been no time. In a world with no 
time, past, present, and future are equally (un)real and always, everything 
that presently exists or occurs is temporally present.4
Let “existence” name what something has just if it is in the domain of 
the unrestricted existential quantifier. Then a second try at stating uni-
versal presentism might be the following:
ID. Existence = absolute temporal presentness.5
Every time is, was or will be present at itself. Being absolutely present is 
being present not at a time, but simpliciter: being present, full stop. The 
problem with (ID) is that it is an identity-statement. As such, it is neces-
sary if true. But in my timeless worlds, things exist without being present. 
To get around this, we might try the following:
Role: If anything is temporal, existence only plays the role of the prop-
erty of absolute temporal presentness.
Role says the following: If anything is temporal, some predications of ab-
solute temporal presentness are true. But what makes them all true is that 
something has existence. Existence never shows up without making such 
a predication true; whatever exists, thereby is temporally present. Role 
does not rule out timeless worlds.
However, Role won’t do either. Universal presentism should be incom-
patible with the claim that past, present, and future are equally real. But 
Role is compatible with it; in a timeless world, both it and Role are true. To 
get past this, I suggest taking universal presentism as this claim:
not clearly false, strictly, that is a task for those who push incompatibility arguments, not for 
me. If my statements don’t work in the end, well, it’s my targets who need to do better, and 
what I have to say can be restated to meet their new version. 
4If there are no presently existing things, there are no presently existing things that fail to 
be temporally present.
5For this sort of definition see, e.g., Tallant, “Defining Existence Presentism,” 494 and 
Zimmerman, “Persistence and Presentism,” 117. 
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UP1. Something is temporal, and existence only plays the role of abso-
lute temporal presentness.
If there can be a timeless world, UP1 is contingent. But perhaps that’s as it 
should be. Presentists, again, want to say roughly that only present things 
exist. That is just not true in a timeless world. So their basic thought is con-
tingently true at best. UP1 is substantive, and incompatible with the equal 
reality of past, present and future. So perhaps UP1 is adequate. Another 
account of universal presentism is the following:
UP2. Something is temporal, each time has its own sole class of all real 
things, and no such class contains anything wholly past, wholly future 
or atemporal.6
Again, this is contingent, incompatible with the equal reality of present, 
past and future, and substantive.
Another sort of presentism is more restricted. Temporal presentism as-
serts only this:
TP1. Something is temporal, and for temporal things, existence only 
plays the role of absolute temporal presentness,
or
TP2. Something is temporal, each time has its own sole class of all tem-
poral things, and no such class contains anything wholly past or wholly 
future.
Universalism and temporalism agree that time is always only as thick as 
the present; universalism adds that time is all there is to reality. Most his-
torical presentists were temporal presentists.7 For most believed in some 
atemporal reality, and temporalism allows this. Universal presentism is 
largely a late twentieth-century phenomenon.
Argument is hardly needed to show that DA is incompatible with uni-
versal presentism. Further, those who argue the incompatibility do so to 
argue against DA, and it would beg the question to assume universalism 
in arguing against DA. For to assume universalism is to assume that there 
is no atemporal God. So it is charitable to take them as trying to show 
that DA and temporal presentism are incompatible. I now examine four 
arguments for this.8
6This tweaks a claim by Dean Zimmerman in his “The A-Theory of Time,” 791–809. 
7Perhaps “meant to be” would be better. They did not avoid tautology in stating their 
views, and temporal presentism is not supposed to be tautologous.
8Strictly, the authors I now discuss argue not that DA is incompatible with presentism, 
but that it is incompatible with all theories of time with an absolute moving present, the 
genus of which presentism is a species. In effect, then, they argue about a disjunction of theo-
ries, one of which is presentism. So it is fair to treat them as claiming inter alia that presentism 
and DA are incompatible. I discuss presentism in particular because it is the most popular 
such view and the view furthest from the only theory of time the authors I discuss think is 
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Omniscience and Immutability
The best-known argument on this subject isn’t precisely for the conclusion 
that DA and presentism are incompatible. It’s for the conclusion that DA, 
continual divine omniscience, and presentism are.9 The basic thought is 
this: On presentism, some time is now, in an absolute sense. It is all there 
is to time; it exists and no other time does.10 What time is now changes 
as time passes. To stay omniscient, God must always know everything. 
So what time He knows to be now must change as time passes. But an 
atemporal being does not change; something changes only if it has a prop-
erty at some time and lacks it at some other, and so only temporal things 
change. So, given presentism, God cannot both stay omniscient and be 
atemporal. I discuss this argument below. For now I only point to a hidden 
assumption: if some time is now in an absolute sense for things in time, it 
is now in an absolute sense for God. That is,
Time’s Way: The way things are for things in time is the way things are 
for God.
The present case of Time’s Way may seem obviously correct, for here it 
amounts to saying that if only one time exists in time, only that one time 
exists for God. All the same, I question this later.
For now, I point out that this case of Time’s Way is not dialectically neutral. 
For a presentist, only the present time exists in time. Many of DA’s friends 
do not believe that only the present time exists for an atemporal God, even 
if they are temporal presentists. Boethius is a temporal presentist.11 But 
consider his classic simile: an atemporal God is as if on a mountain top, 
looking out on an entire future those lower down cannot see.12 It is part of 
the image that all the future is really there at once to be seen. Boethius’s 
solution to the freedom-foreknowledge problem hinges on the claim that 
God’s knowledge is of all time at once and observational.13 The simile sug-
compatible with DA, namely, that present, past and future are equally real and there is no 
moving present. As it is furthest, it makes the most interesting test case.
9Contemporary discussion of this began with Kretzmann, “Omniscience and Immuta-
bility,” 409–421. For a specifically presentist version, see Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting,” 
77–98. 
10Those who push this argument always ignore relativistic complications. For present 
purposes, I’ll let them. 
11Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy V, prose 6, ll. 12–18.
12Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy V, prose 6, ll. 70–72.
13Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy V, prose 6, ll. 72–83. This is simply what Boethius 
says. However, the Consolation ends by saying that future events do not cause God’s knowl-
edge (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy V, prose 6, ll. 155—163), which vitiates the claim 
that God’s knowledge is observational. This final move leaves it unclear that the Consolation 
as a whole has a solution to the problem: Boethius may mean the Consolation to end with 
an aporia, though perhaps his point is that the existence of the future makes true what God 
believes even if it does not cause God’s belief state. Still, insofar as Boethius has a solution, it 
is in the part of the Consolation which speaks of observation. Just why Boethius drops that 
bombshell at the end is an interpretive question whose answer depends on the overall point 
the Consolation wants to make. But for present purposes I need not address it.
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gests that observation sees what is there to be seen, and being unaware of 
the finite speed of light and its implications for vision, Boethius can hardly 
have thought otherwise. Boethius, then, denies Time’s Way.
Craig’s Causal Relation Argument
I now pass to another argument. William Craig argues the following:
Suppose . . . that God did not exist temporally prior to creation . . . once [He 
creates], God . . . becomes temporal in virtue of His real, causal relation to 
. . . the world . . . which is in that moment new to God and which He does 
not have . . . sans creation . . . Hence . . . creating the world . . . draws Him 
into time at that very moment in virtue of His (new) real relation to the . . . 
universe.14 In creating the world God . . . undergoes an extrinsic change . . . 
God comes into (a) relation . . . in which He did not stand before.15
We could put the argument this way:
1. Whatever creates a temporal universe comes into a new relation.
2. Whatever comes into a new relation changes extrinsically.
3. Whatever changes extrinsically is or becomes temporal. Therefore,
4. If God creates a temporal universe, God is or becomes temporal.
For Craig, “the reality of tense”16 is what gives “oomph” to the thought 
that once God creates, something really new is on the scene, and so 
God must bear a new relation. Craig’s version of “the reality of tense” is 
presentism.17 Thus Craig thinks (1)–(4) show that presentism and atem-
porality are incompatible. I think a non-presentist could endorse (1)–(3). 
Suppose that past, present and future alike exist. Still we seem to have (1). 
Whatever creates a temporal universe has at that instant a relation it did 
not have earlier, and that is as much reason to call the relation new as we 
have on presentism. And it comes into that relation, i.e., it stands in it due 
to an event. (2) and (3) too are no worse off if past, present and future are 
equally real. So if past, present and future are equally real, we still have 
(1)–(3), as far as I can see, unless there just are no such things as events if 
this view is true.18 But standard accounts of events seem compatible with 
that.19 Still, if presentism implies (1), then (1)–(4), if sound, still shows a 
conflict between presentism and atemporality.
14Craig, God, Time and Eternity, 60.
15Craig, Time and Eternity, 87.
16Craig, God, Time and Eternity, 59.
17Craig, “In Defense of Presentism,” 391. Craig states presentism as “the only temporal 
items that exist are those that exist presently” (391). This is meant to state temporal pre-
sentism, I think. It is however a tautology.
18Craig might be happy with this: if I’m right, the argument, if sound, would show that 
DA is compatible with the existence of time no matter what parts of it are real.
19For instance, Kim defines an event as a thing having a property at a time. Thus no wor-
ries arise here. (See Kim, “Events as Property-Exemplifications,” 159—177.)
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Let us ask why we are supposed to believe (1). Craig sees a timeless 
God’s relation to creation as new because he thinks that He in some sense 
first exists “sans creation.”20 No clear-eyed atemporalist would accept this. 
An atemporal God does not come to have new relations. (We see just why 
below.) He just timelessly has any relation He ever has.21 If so, none of 
God’s life is sans creation. There is just the one atemporal point in His 
life. At that point, He creates, and so Creation is there. What is new for 
Creation is not new for Him. Craig, however, thinks that what is new for 
Creation must be new for Him: this is why he thinks that He must “first” 
have been “sans creation.” If it’s new in time, it’s new for God; lurking in 
the background is Time’s Way.
Padgett’s “ZTR” Argument
Let us now take up another argument. Alan Padgett begins from a defini-
tion: events are Zero Time Related (ZTRed) iff no duration occurs between 
them.22 He then add the following premises:
5. If God is timeless, any divine sustaining is ZTRed with its effect, 
and
6. If presentism is true, for all t, an act done ZTRed to t is real only 
ZTRed to t.
(5) is true. If God is timeless, God’s sustaining is not located in time. There 
is duration between only things located in time. So if God is timeless, there 
is no duration between His acts and anything else.
Now suppose temporal presentism and that t1 ≠ t2, e1 occurs only at t1, 
e2 occurs only at t2, and God sustains e1 and e2. Then as an instance of (5),
20Craig, God, Time and Eternity, 60.
21I think that if God “starts out” atemporal, He must remain so. For suppose that Craig is 
right, and consider God’s initial atemporal willing that temporal things exist. If God becomes 
temporal, either this never ceases to be there atemporally, or it ceases to be so and comes to 
have been past, or it ceases to be so and comes to be present. If the first, then even if God is 
now temporal, there is still an atemporal state of affairs, God willing this. If so, it is now true 
both that God is temporal and that He is not. If the second or third, the atemporal part of 
God’s life is over. But how could something be both atemporal and over? Being over seems 
a paradigmatically temporal state of affairs; anything that’s over is not atemporal but in the 
past. If it’s not over, the atemporal part of God’s life is not over and yet He has a temporal 
life: He’s living an atemporal and a temporal life “at once.” But if it is over, then if the second, 
the first instant of time (which is what God’s willing causes) had a past. If the second or 
third, what is atemporally the case has altered; the atemporal realm has suffered a deletion. 
This seems impossible to me; I think that what is atemporally the case is immutably the 
case. Think of Plato’s heaven of Forms: could a Form just vanish from there, to reappear on 
earth? Again, a number of theories of events (e.g., Kim’s) make an event’s date a constituent 
of it, essential to its identity—different time, different event. This is a plausible move. But on 
the second and third alternatives, the same event includes first one date (the null one) “and 
then” another, the first instant. God’s willing that time exist both was and wasn’t at the first 
instant, without enduring from one instant to another. There are just these three alternatives, 
and it seems to me that an impossibility crops up no matter which we pick.
22Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, 21.
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7. If God is timeless, God’s sustaining e1 is ZTRed to t1 and God’s sus-
taining e2 is ZTRed to t2.
Further, from (6),
8. If presentism is true, if God’s sustaining e1 is ZTRed to t1, it is not 
real ZTRed to t2, and if God’s sustaining e2 is ZTRed to t2, it is not 
real ZTRed to t1.
As Padgett puts it later,
Even a timeless God must await the present moment to act on really existing 
(present) things . . . God can be . . . timeless . . . and still have to wait for a 
temporal world to pass by.23
He adds that if
God sustains E at . . . t2 (then) if it is not t2, then God is not . . . putting forth 
this specific power . . . For if he did . . . E would . . . exist . . . God, therefore, 
must wait until . . . t2 to act . . . God’s sustaining power must change between 
(earlier) and t2, or . . . E would not come into existence at t2.
24
If God has a different effect at the two times, Padgett thinks, there must be 
different exertions of His power at those times. (7) and (8), Padgett thinks, 
imply that
9. If presentism is true, God really changes from t1 to t2 (from sustain-
ing e1 to sustaining e2).
10. If God is timeless, God does not really change. So,
11. If presentism is true and God is timeless, God does and does not 
really change.25 So,
12. Presentism and DA are incompatible.
Note the basic thought of Padgett’s argument: if we in time must wait, 
God must wait. If a temporal act ZTRed to t is real only ZTRed to t, the 
same must be true for an atemporal act ZTRed to t. If it is that way for 
things in time, it is that way for God. Again we meet Time’s Way. And 
again, Time’s Way is not dialectically neutral. If I wait for something and 
then it arrives, my life has an earlier part in which I wait and a later one in 
which I do not. If my life has temporal parts, I am temporal. Thus a time-
less being cannot wait. To assume that God must wait is to assume that He 
is in time. Now universal presentism implies Time’s Way: on universal pre-
sentism, there are only things in time, and so there is no room for things 
to be any other way than the way they are for things in time. But temporal 
presentism leaves room for the atemporal. So on temporal presentism, 
23Padgett, “Eternity as Relative Timelessness,” 97. The equation of “really existing” and 
“present” reveals Padgett’s presentism; see also 96.
24Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, 74–75.
25Padgett, God, Eternity and the Nature of Time, 72–73.
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there is at least room to ask why we should think that temporal things are 
for an atemporal God the way they are for things in time. First, though, a 
last argument for incompatibility.
DeWeese’s “Function” Argument
For Boethius, a timeless God somehow has all of time there to see “at 
once.” To Anselm, this implies the following:
Eternity has its own simultaneity, in which exist all things that occur at the 
same time . . . and . . . at different times.26
Plausibly, on Anselm’s account,
13. If God is timeless, the series of temporal events exists in eternity in 
an atemporal analogue A of the temporal order.
With this in mind, DeWeese argues as follows:
14. A function F pairs temporal events with positions in A.
One might expect this, since those very events make up A. Now plausibly
15. No function pairs nonexistent with existent items.
After all, one might think, something can be paired with something only 
if it is there to be paired. But then
16. If the future does not exist, F does not pair future events with A. So
17. If the future does not exist, A does not contain future events.27 So
18. If the future does not exist, either A grows or A is incomplete.
19. A cannot grow, as A is atemporal and what is atemporal cannot 
change. Further,
20. A cannot be incomplete.
For A is what God “sees”: if A is incomplete, God is not omniscient. So
21. All future events exist. So
22. If God is timeless, time is not presentist.28
DeWeese takes it that what constitutes A are times’ events themselves, 
existing in eternity. (For now, pretend that you understand this.) So what 
puzzles him can be put more simply: how can A be timelessly complete if 
there is now no future to complete it? The question insists that there is just 
one way things really are, the way they are now for things in time, and so 
26Anselm, de Concordia I, 5.
27DeWeese moves from (18) to (19) because he treats the function as somehow generating 
points in A given events in T (DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 182).
28DeWeese, God and the Nature of Time, 181, 183. DeWeese’s actual conclusion is that if God 
is timeless, no tensed theory of time is true.
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eternity can’t contain more than what is currently in time. If it is that way for 
things in time, it is that way for God in eternity: again we meet Time’s Way.
Why Time’s Way?
These are all the arguments I know for the incompatibility of presentism 
and DA. I show elsewhere that all but the first are unsound regardless of 
what we make of Time’s Way,29 but here, what is relevant is that all involve 
Time’s Way, and in the first, only Time’s Way seems possibly contentious. 
So I suggest that Time’s Way is really the nerve of the case for the incom-
patibility. Those who give these arguments mean them to tell against DA. 
So again, we should take them to be discussing temporal presentism, and 
again, on temporalism, it’s at least worth asking why we should believe 
Time’s Way. There are seven obvious answers.
A. Time’s Way is the simplest assumption, and so is our default.
I grant this. But any number of things can be sufficient reason to abandon 
the simplest, default position on any philosophical issue. If this were all 
one could say for Time’s Way, then even one good argument for DA would 
be enough to justify abandoning it. I think there are more than one.30
B. There is just one ultimate way things are. How could there be two? 
The way things are for things in time is at least a way things are. So 
if there is just one way things are, it is the only way things are.
I reply that perhaps the one ultimate way things are is that there are two 
ways things are, a way they are for things in time and a way they are for 
something atemporal. There has to be a single true story about how things 
are. But there could be more than one way to tell that story, or it might con-
sist irreducibly in two partial stories. A novel told from two viewpoints, 
with no omniscient narrator tying them together, is all the same one novel, 
telling one story.
C. If we add an atemporal story to the temporal one, but do not as-
sume Time’s Way—letting things be different for an atemporal God 
than for things in time—the result is inconsistent. For then if God is 
timeless, future things that are not there in time are there for Him to 
see. So if God is timeless, future entities both exist and do not exist.
I reply that contradiction seems to threaten only because we ignore tense. 
If God is atemporal, future entities do not both exist and not exist. “They 
do not exist” uses the ordinary present tense. “They exist” does not use 
this, because it states how things are in what Anselm calls the simultaneity 
of eternity and what Augustine, Boethius and Anselm call the eternal 
present. So “they exist” has either no tense or a tense that expresses the 
eternal present.
29See Leftow, Anselm’s God.
30See Leftow, Time and Eternity, 267–282.
182 Faith and Philosophy
D. Even if adding the atemporal story does not generate a contradic-
tion, it generates obvious falsehoods. William Hasker, for instance, 
asks: if future events exist in eternity, as Anselm says, aren’t they 
atemporal, just like God?31
The answer is no. Future events will occur. Nothing atemporal will occur.
E. Hasker tries again with this: If temporal events are all eternally 
there for God to see, “The existence of my chalk-stub is as enduring 
as that of the Andromeda Galaxy. Boethius’s ‘moving and transitory 
moment’ (is) as eternal as . . . God Himself. The . . . contrast between 
temporal beings and the Eternal Being has been undercut.”32
This is good rhetoric, but its underlying thought is questionable. Let us 
ask why temporal events are supposed to be there in the simultaneity of 
eternity and what that really means. If God is not in time, His life has 
no proper temporal parts. Nor is anything before it. What has something 
before it ipso facto is in time. So nothing is ever over in His life. For if it was 
over in His life, either it would lie in a past part of His life, or it would be 
before His life. Again, if God is not in time, nothing is after any part of His 
life. So He never has a future. So nothing has not yet started in His life. If it 
had not yet started, it would lie in His future, and He has none. Now God 
sustains and “sees” all temporal events. That provides a rather thick sense 
in which they are all “in” His life. So for a timeless God, everything is in 
the same simple bit of His life: everything in His own life and everything 
in history. In His life, nothing is ever yet to come or over. This is how things 
are, objectively, in relation to Him. It is not a matter of how things appear 
to Him. We live through some events before we live through others. God 
does not live through any event before He lives through others. If He did, 
His life would have earlier and later parts.
For events to be in the simultaneity of eternity is for them to be “in” the 
same simple bit of God’s life. The order (or lack of order) in which God 
lives through them has no implication for these events’ ordering or dura-
tion in other lives. Rather, if God is atemporal, the order of episodes of His 
life comes apart from the ordering of events in temporal lives. Temporal 
events are in temporal lives ordered as earlier and later, but they are in 
His life too, and as events in His life they are not ordered as earlier and 
later, for He lives no part of His life before He lives any other. One can 
tell consistent time-travel stories that order temporal events differently in 
different lives.33 Suppose you hear me give a paper, realize you’ve missed 
something important, and so leave the room, time-travel back to its start, 
31Hasker, “The Absence of a Timeless God,” 196–197.
32Hasker, “The Absence of a Timeless God,” 197.
33Some might say that time-travel is inconsistent with presentism, and so time-travel sto-
ries cannot show that anything is compatible with presentism. I cannot discuss this here, but 
see, e.g., Keller and Nelson, “Presentists Should Believe in Time-Travel,” 333–345; Monton, 
“Presentists Can Believe,” 199–202; Rea, Metaphysics, 78–87. 
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enter the room, and hear it again. Then two episodes of your life coincide 
with one episode of mine. I live through two episodes of your life at once, 
while you do not, along your own timeline.34 Episodes of your life are 
ordered differently in my life than they are along your own timeline—but 
this does not affect their order or length in your life. Nor does it affect how 
long my paper lasts. If you were immortal and spent the rest of your life in 
a series of hearings of my paper, always leaving the room just as I start my 
last paragraph, my paper would never be over for you. But that would not 
imply that in itself, my paper was never over. The way my paper was for 
you would be due strictly to how episodes of your life are arranged, and 
that would not alter my paper’s length.
If God is atemporal, all of time is “in” the single, temporally simple 
episode of His life. This is due to the way His life is—to its lack of parts to 
order, its being “outside” time, and to the events in Himself which place 
all temporal events “in” it. It has no more implication for the order or 
duration of events in other lives than facts about a time-traveler would. It 
is as if God time-traveled to every instant at the same instant in His life: 
nothing is ever over to Him, but that does not imply that nothing is ever 
over. What arrives later in time does not arrive later in God’s life than 
what arrives earlier in time; it is “in” the same part of God’s life. If God’s 
life is simple and outside time, it does not pass away or extend into later 
parts. So as the present arrives, it is “with” God’s whole life, and as the 
future later arrives, it too is “with” all of God’s life. So what is real differs 
depending on whose life is in question. In temporal lives, the future does 
not exist. In a simple life “there” with all of time, it does. This no more 
implies that events are not short than my time-travel story implies that my 
paper is not short. That nothing is ever over for a timeless God is due only 
to the way His life is. It does not imply that nothing is ever over simpliciter, 
let alone that my chalk-stub lasts as long as Andromeda. All it means to 
say that temporal events “exist in the simultaneity of eternity” is that (a) 
they occur in God’s life, (b) as that life is outside the ordinary temporal 
order, as a time-traveler’s would be, they are ordered differently in that 
life than in others, and (c) as that life is simple, they are not ordered as 
earlier and later in it.
F. Add an atemporal to a temporal story, and human freedom is in 
jeopardy. How can we have alternate possibilities of action, Hasker 
asks, when “in . . . eternity, nothing can be changed . . . There is no 
. . . possibility that I will act differently. . . . Divine timelessness can 
be reconciled with libertarian freedom only if . . . there are future 
actions of my own which timelessly exist in eternity (and) it is in 
my power, now, to bring it about that those actions do not exist in 
eternity. Does anyone seriously believe that?”35
34Along the public timeline, you do: earlier you and later you are both listening at (say) 
3 p.m.
35Hasker, “The Absence of a Timeless God,” 197–198.
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I reply that my eating breakfast tomorrow is in God’s life because to-
morrow, I freely choose to eat. It is there because I put it there; I determine 
to what He (as it were) time-travels. If when I do the action I can do oth-
erwise, my freedom then also is in His life. (Anselm is explicit on this.36) 
Being in God’s life entails not that I can’t do otherwise, but only that I 
won’t. Again, it was true yesterday that my eating tomorrow is timelessly 
“in” God’s life, but as long as the explanation runs from the action to the 
truth yesterday, there is no real issue here, unless logical fatalism is a much 
stronger position than we generally think.
G. The last somewhat-obvious answer is this: we believe Time’s Way 
because there is no coherent, plausible picture of how things could 
be otherwise.
Well, I think there may be one. I now sketch it.
Discrete Times
I start from a definition:
there are two discrete Times = df. there are two series of events S and S*, 
every event in S bears some temporal relation to some event in S, every 
event in S* bears some temporal relation to some event in S*, and no 
event in S bears any temporal relation to any event in S*.
S and S* are discrete times, no event in one is earlier than or at the same 
time as any event in the other. I suggest that possibly
DT: There are two discrete Times.
For there is no contradiction in this, and an abstract “diagram” of there 
being two series has the sheen of plausibility about it that provokes an 
intuition of possibility. Further, some inflationary cosmologies let baby 
universes “pinch off” from a parent spacetime, and so be (become?) 
temporally discrete from it.37 Such cosmologies are offered as physical 
explanations. So the evidence they explain confirms them. Evidence for 
them, then, is stronger evidence than conceivability or intuition that DT 
is possible. Finally, we could have still further reason to believe DT: for 
we could have reason to believe that God had revealed DT to us. This 
would not suppose thinking Him atemporal, either. If He were temporal 
and sited in our time, He might know DT by knowing about the “pinching 
off” and understanding its consequences.
36Anselm, De Concordia I, 5.
37My thanks here to Pedro Ferreira. These stories must involve more dimensions than our 
usual four, if in them bits of space-time change status. To make this clear, I now subscript 
certain words “5,” to indicate reference to events, processes, relations, etc. that involve a 
further dimension. Say, then, that spacetime 2 first is5 part of spacetime 1 and then5 pinches5 
off. Then first5, the “first” time-slice of 2 was (say) after1 the last of 1. But once5 2 pinches5 off 
from 1, it is5 not. 2 ceases5 to have1 a past1, though it continues5 to have5 a past5 in which it 
has1 a past1. If we call dimension 5 hypertime, we can say that 2 hyper-ceases to have a past, 
though it hyper-continues to hyper-have a hyper-past in which it has a past. 
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I think DT is compatible with both forms of presentism. First, universal. 
UP2 requires only that each time have a certain associated class. It says 
nothing about the ordering or grouping of those times. So UP2 is perfectly 
compatible with DT. UP1 says nothing about how many Times existence 
plays the presentness-role in: it does not require that there be only one. 
And having two Times is not having “two presents at once.” Presentness 
can be had at different times related as earlier and later, so why not equally 
at different times not related as earlier and later? There would not then be 
a single all-encompassing present-tensed quantifier, but it is not part of 
presentism as defined above that there be one. So to create a problem for 
DT, one will have to argue that this is needed or perhaps that there is no 
coherent alternative: neither is just slam-dunk obvious.
Still, it’s illicit to assume universal presentism in this context. For we’re 
debating DA, and in that debate, universalism just does beg the question. 
So again, our concern is temporal presentism. This seems compatible with 
DT much as universal did: TP2 too places no constraints on how times 
are ordered, and TP1 lets existence play that role in more than one Time. 
Further, on temporal presentism, an all-encompassing present-tensed 
quantifier would be a bit of a tough sell. For temporal presentism is in-
tentionally silent on whether there might be things outside time, and such 
a quantifier would break the silence. As to a temporally all-encompassing 
present-tensed quantifier, it would take arguing to show that temporal 
presentism requires it. I submit, then, that temporal presentism and DT 
are compatible.
If DT were true and our Time were temporal-presentist, the other Time 
would be too. TP1 and TP2 straightforwardly entail this, and it is plausible 
independently. For temporal presentism articulates the nature of time, not 
just of our Time. If there could be non-presentist time despite the argu-
ments for temporal presentism, it becomes an uncomfortable question just 
why the arguments would not look equally good in a world indiscern-
ible from ours save for not being presentist. Thus given DT and temporal 
presentism, each Time has its own absolute present. If there were one 
absolute present spanning the Times, they would not be discrete.
Suppose then that there are two Times. Let us consider the status in 
Time 1 of what is2 present2 in Time 2. It is false that it exists1 or existed1 
or will1 exist1. But in Time 2, it exists2. So in Time 1, it is now true that it 
exists2, but now is not a time at which it exists2, a time simultaneous with 
that—else the Times are not after all discrete.38 Let’s use EXISTS to abbre-
viate things like this: EXISTING in a time-series is existing, but not in that 
series. Looking at reality as a whole, then, there are two partial stories to 
tell, one in 1-tenses in which what is present in 2 EXISTS but never exists1, 
and one in 2-tenses in which what is present in 1 EXISTS but never exists2. 
The stories fit together consistently and together leave nothing out.
38The truth of < it exists2 > is simultaneous with now, but I show below that this does not 
imply what it may seem to.
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From Discrete Times to Eternity
Next step: add that 1 is not only one instant thick, but one instant long—
that all there ever was or will be to 1 is one instant. Then 1’s present can’t 
pass away. For if it passed away, it would be past. But if it is past, there 
must be a time at which it is past. For if it is never true—i.e., true at no 
time—that it is past, it just never is past. The time cannot be 1’s single 
instant. For if it passed away, it would not be there to be past, and with no 
other instant in 1, there would be no 1-time at which it was past. And if it 
did not pass away, it would be present, not past.
Nor can the time be some proper part of 2. For suppose that 1’s instant 
is past at some proper part of 2. The proper part either does or does not 
include all of 2 before some point. If it does not, then before that proper 
part, 1’s present was not past. So there is a time in 2 when 1’s instant be-
comes past. So its becoming past is simultaneous with a 2-time, violating 
the series’ discreteness. If the proper part does include all of 2 before 
some point, then that part either does or does not have a first instant. If 
1’s instant is past at 2’s first instant, 2 is after 1’s instant is present. If 2 has 
no first instant, but still 1’s instant is past before all of its earlier part, 1’s 
instant is past at all of 2, and so 2 as a whole is after 1. Being past at the 
whole series violates the series’ discreteness: there is then a 2-time, namely 
the sum of all 2-times, at which 1 is past. Nor can the time be 2 as a whole. 
For one thing, this seems again to place 1 straightforwardly before 2. If this 
somehow does not follow, then, if 1’s instant is past at 2 as a whole, it is 
equally present at 2 as a whole—there is no more reason to say the former 
than to say the latter. But nothing is past and present at the same time.39
Thus if 1 is just an instant long, that instant and what it contains cannot 
pass away, because there is no later time for these to be past at. This gives 
us Boethius’s and Anselm’s picture: two presents, 1’s “unmoving” and so 
eternal, 2’s “flowing” and so temporal. If you don’t think there can be instants 
without periods they bound, think of 1 as an extended temporal simple.40 
So understood, the Boethius-Anselm picture is at least coherent: presentism 
is coherent and there is no hidden contradiction in the theses that an inde-
pendent point or an extended simple exists. Further, the Boethius-Anselm 
picture satisfies TP1 and TP2, because DT does, and shortening one series 
has no effect on that. There is not even an appearance of incompatibility 
with TP1. As to TP2, every time in 2 has its own class of what is temporally 
real, and no such class includes the wholly past or wholly future. That all 
2-times are “in” God’s life doesn’t seem to affect that, and if God’s life is not 
a time, it need not satisfy TP2. Further, if we do require it to satisfy TP2, it 
does, trivially, for in God’s life nothing is past or future.
39 In a nutshell, what is present passes away only if there is a later time at which it is past. 
This implies that “flowing” time cannot have a last instant. I accept this; I don’t see it as a 
cost.
40For Boethius as an early friend of extended simples, see my Time and Eternity, 112–146. 
Anselm may favor a point model: see his de Incarnatione Verbi, 15.
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A Compatibility Claim
The case that DA and temporal presentism are incompatible rests on Time’s 
Way. I’ve argued that six obvious ways to justify Time’s Way fail. The last 
claims that there is no coherent, plausible picture of how things would be 
without Time’s Way. I submit that as modelled via DT, the Boethian pic-
ture is coherent. Further, it is at least somewhat plausible: there is decent 
support that possibly DT and both independent instants and extended 
simples are within the range of acceptable philosophical hypotheses. So 
I submit that we do not actually have reason to accept Time’s Way. If so, 
then on the claim that DA and temporal presentism are incompatible, we 
should return at best a Scots verdict: case not proven. But if the picture 
is at least coherent, that is some reason to think it is possible, as are the 
last paragraph’s compatibility arguments. If it is possible, temporal pre-
sentism and DA are compatible.
Back to Omniscience / Immutability
I now apply DT against Time’s Way and the argument from omniscience. 
Suppose, then, that there are two presentist Times, 1 and 2. Consider an 
object O present in 1. As we’ve seen, it is true in 2 that O EXISTS. But 
this cannot begin or cease to be the case in 2. For suppose that O ceased 
to EXIST in 2. This could only be because it had ceased to exist1; if it did 
exist1, it would still EXIST in 2. Next, ask why it would cease to EXIST in 
2 when it did. There are just two options. On one, O ceases to EXIST in 2 
because and so when it ceases to exist1 in 1. If so, then a time in 2 is when 
in 2 O ceases to exist1: this has a date in 2. What has a date occurs simulta-
neous with that date. And if a 1-event is2 simultaneous with a date in 2, 1 is 
not discrete from 2. So if 1 is discrete from 2, what I have described never 
happens. This drives us to the other option, namely, that when O ceases 
to exist1 does not explain when O ceases to EXIST in 2. But then there is 
no reason it would cease to EXIST in 2 at one time rather than another. 
How could it just happen to happen when it does, rather than having this 
determined by what happens in 1?
One alternative is not compatible with DT. The other leaves a surd mys-
tery. I submit, then, that if in 2 O EXISTS, in 2 O never begins or ceases to 
EXIST. Now if items in 1 did not EXIST in 2 when past1 or future1, they 
would begin or cease to EXIST in 2. So in 2, all items at all times in 1 always 
EXIST, no matter when in 1 they exist1.
41 Equally, all 1-times always EXIST 
in 2. So a 1-time at which O is1 present1 and one at which O is1 future1 
always EXIST in 2. In 2, O cannot begin or cease to be past1 or present1 or 
future1. 1-times at which it is all three equally EXIST from the standpoint 
of 2. So at all 2-times, O’s existence has either all 1-tenses or none.
41But in 1, past or future items never EXIST. For O EXISTS in 1 only if O exists, but not in 
1. So 1 still never has past or future parts. Nor does 2 have past or future parts relative to 1: 
for while 2’s past and future EXIST relative to 1, they are not past2 or future2 relative to 1, and 
in neither 1 nor 2 do they exist2.
188 Faith and Philosophy
Suppose that it has all 1-tenses. Then while in 1, that O is1 wholly future1 
entails that O is1 not present1, in 2, it does not entail this. Yet that O is1 
wholly future1 cannot both entail and not entail that O is1 not present1. 
Now “O” refers to O no matter in which Time the sentences are tokened. So 
on this alternative, one of the predicates must express different properties 
in the two Times. Being wholly future and being present are incompatible. 
So either “is1 wholly future1,” tokened in 2, does not express being future1, 
or “is1 present1,” tokened in 2, does not express being present1. But there 
is no reason for only one tense not to work in 2. If any don’t work, none 
do. So 1-tensed properties can’t be expressed in 2. In 2, 1-tensed language 
expresses only tenseless facts. Moreover, if in 2, being wholly future1 is 
compatible with being present1, these two things are compatible, pure and 
simple: being wholly future1 just does not entail not being present1. But of 
course, it does entail this. So they are not compatible in 2, and so O’s exis-
tence cannot have all 1-tenses in 2. But it cannot have only some, and it has 
no 2-tense either, because it is not located in 2. So if we start out assuming 
that O’s existence has all 1-tenses in 2, we end up concluding not just that 
1-tensed facts can’t be expressed in 2, but that O’s existence is tenseless in 2.
This is what follows if we suppose that at all 2-times, O’s existence has 
all 1-tenses. Suppose on the other hand that at all 2-times, O’s existence 
has no 1-tense. Then in 2, O’s existence is tenseless, since it cannot have 
2-tenses. So whether we say that in 2 O’s existence has all 1-tenses or that 
it has none, it turns out that in 2, O’s existence is tenseless. In 2, there just 
are no 1-tensed facts. And this is as it should be: if O’s being present1 were 
1-tensed in 2, 2-events would be simultaneous with O’s being present1, 
and so 1 and 2 would not be discrete.
Again, in 2, all 1-times have the same ontological status: they EXIST. 
But if a Time is metaphysically tensed, not all its times have the same 
ontological status. So in 2, 1 just is not metaphysically tensed. The meta-
physical differences in 1 which 1’s tenses mark within 1 are not there in 
2. Thus if there were two presentist Times, the metaphysically significant 
tense of each would be strictly internal to itself. It would be real within 
the Time, but not from without. Further, if there can be two Times, tense 
is in fact real only internally, even if there is no second Time.42 For adding 
42The editor notes that this makes presentness relative, in a way. If it is, how can I in-
voke absolute presentness in defining presentism? Further, if presentism requires an absolute 
present and DT makes the present relative, presentism and DT are not after all compatible. I 
reply: I defined being absolutely present as being present in a way not relative to a time, but 
just present, full stop. Being relative to a time ≠ being relative to a Time. So not being relative 
to a time ≠ not being relative to a Time. If there are two presentist Times, in 1, eventually 
events at t are1 not just present1 at t, but present1, even if from 2, they are not. Presentism re-
quires a present absolute within its Time, not one absolute in the sense of not being indexed 
to a Time.
 This courts objections. Objection 1: being present at t includes t; it’s a dated prop-
erty. Being present1 is being present in Time 1. “Time 1” expresses a date, an answer to a 
when-question. So being present1 is dated too. So if being dated rules out being absolute, 
presentness indexed to a Time can’t be absolute. Objection 2: a Time just is many times. So 
being Time-relative is being relative to many times. So the distinction is artificial. Objection 
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something outside a Time to one’s ontology does not change the nature of 
time. It can only reveal the nature time had all along. Now Time’s Way im-
plies that a Time is metaphysically tensed externally as well as internally. 
So if possibly DT, Time’s Way is false.
All this yields a response to the omniscience argument. That argument 
supposes that it is (say) now noon both in time and for God, outside time. 
But if possibly DT, such metaphysically-tensed facts are facts only within 
Times. From an external standpoint, there are none: it is not now noon or 
any other time. For it is now noon, for a presentist, only if only the noon 
bit of time is real. From outside time, all of time EXISTS, that is the only 
fact about its ontological status, and so from outside time, it is not noon. 
So a timeless God can be omniscient even if it is now noon and He does 
not know this. For at His standpoint, it is not now noon, and one cannot 
expect God to know what is not true at His standpoint.
A Thesis From Aquinas
Aquinas famously or notoriously held that while creatures are “really 
related” to God, God is not “really related” to creatures.43 For Aquinas, 
God simply does not have real relational properties ad extra.44 I do not 
3: on presentism, a Time isn’t even many times. Only its present exists. So on presentism, 
being Time-relative just is being relative to a time. Objection 4: in a one-instant Time, the 
distinction disappears altogether.
 I reply as follows. Ad 1: we needn’t take subscripting with “1” as a way of dating, of saying 
“in Time 1.” “Is present1” might better express, e.g., being an event flow through which is 
now generating Time 1. The present is not relative to the series; rather, the series is relative 
to the present. To me, at least, this does not sound like a dated property, though “Time 1” is 
a date-term. Mere inclusion of a date-term is not enough to make a phrase express a dated 
property: consider “is thinking about Time 1.” Ad 2: on the approach just sketched, the present 
is not relative to the times. Rather, the times are relative to the present, and so the present 
is in the relevant sense absolute. Ad 3: from an external standpoint, even a presentist Time 
contains many times. Its past and future are real from that standpoint. Ad 4: I have argued 
that something one instant long wouldn’t be a Time. But suppose it would. Still, arguably 
two properties (being present1, being present1 at t in 1) can be distinct even if necessarily co-
instantiated. Further, they are necessarily co-instantiated only if one-instant 1 could not have 
lasted longer: only if Times essentially have just one length. That is at the least not obvious. 
43Aquinas, Summa Theologiae Ia 13, 7. For the backdrop to this, see Henninger, Relations.
44Though the Trinity involves relational properties in some other way. I note below that 
relational properties are one thing, relations another. It is one thing for Isaac to have the 
property of being Abraham’s son and Abraham to have the property of being Isaac’s father, 
and another for there to be a father-son relation which links them, which (so to speak) has a 
hook in both. Like all medieval Aristotelians, if Thomas had the idea of a relation as distinct 
from sets of relational properties, he took it that all the facts could be accounted for strictly 
in terms of relational properties—Aristotelian accidents of individual substances. So while 
he denies real divine relational properties ad extra, he never expresses a view on whether 
real relations can link God and creature. Relational properties would be accidents, and so 
Thomas’s doctrine of divine simplicity rules them out (see, e.g., Summa Theologiae Ia 3, 6). But 
since Aristotle spoke only of relational properties, not relations, there would be no strictly 
textual case for classing relations as Aristotelian accidents. And our current conception of re-
lations as between rather than in their relata does not make them metaphysical constituents. 
It supposes instead that the relata are complete in themselves, there to be related, logically 
before the relations come to (as it were) externally link them. So it is not clear that a concern 
for divine simplicity would preclude recognizing real relations between God and creature as 
distinct from real relational properties in God.
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wish to defend this claim. As far as my present argument goes, it is fine 
if God atemporally has a real relational property of being my Creator, for 
instance. It is also fine for present purposes that there be causal relations 
between God and creation, e.g., a relation which is God’s causing it to 
exist and a relation which is its existence causing God to know in some 
quasi-perceptual manner that it exists—though like any atemporalist, I 
must insist that if the causal relation has an analysis, it does not invoke 
temporal priority.45 In the same way, it is fine that there be relations be-
tween discrete Times, as long as they are neither temporal relations, nor 
relations whose analysis includes those, nor relations about which there 
are substantive metaphysical truths that place temporal relations between 
their relata. But I want to defend part of Aquinas’s claim, and explain why 
a strict Thomist might find the rest plausible. The defense I want to make 
is this: in light of what I’ve said, I submit, change in relations between God 
and Creation need not entail that God is temporal, for it need not entail 
that God changes. If God has real relations ad extra, He does not begin or 
cease to have them.
Suppose that there are two Times. Yesterday I in 1 did not know about 
2. Today I learn about it. So it becomes true that I know about 2. That I 
know about 2 entails that 2 is known about by me. Because this follows, 
the change in me is enough to make both things true. There need not also 
be a change in 2, in which 2 acquires a property, being known about by 
me. I think there is in fact no such change. If there were, it would occur 
at some 2-time. But if it occurred at any one 2-time, plausibly that time 
would be simultaneous with my learning about 2: it would be when in 2 
it became true that the change in 1 occurred, and that seems sufficient for 
the two to be simultaneous. But if a 1-change and a 2-change are simulta-
neous, there are not after all two Times.
Further, if the Times are discrete, no candidate for the title “2-time 
when the 1-change occurred” is any better than any other. There would 
be no reason for one 2-time rather than another to be when the change 
occurred, because before I learned about 2, all 2-times had the same tem-
poral relation to all 1-times: that is, no relation at all. So it seems more 
plausible that 2 at either all or no 2-times have the relational property of 
being known about by me. Whichever is true, 2 never acquires that prop-
erty, even though I acquire the property of knowing about 2. 
If it sounds bizarre to say that it was1 true before I was born that 2 IS 
known about by me, the right way to fill out the story is that 2 never has 
this relational property, though at a certain time in 1, it becomes true that 
2 is known about by me. Aquinas held that even if I at birth acquire the 
relational property of being God’s creature, an atemporal God does not 
45My own view is that it has no analysis, but is just a primitive relation of production. If 
that is correct, then such theses as that necessarily, a cause occurs earlier than its effect cannot 
claim to be arrived at by analyzing the concept of causation. They are at best substantive 
metaphysical truths arrived at by substantive argument. I do not think there are good argu-
ments for such claims, but I cannot pursue the matter here. 
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then or ever acquire or have the relational property of being my Creator.46 
One can argue this just as in the case of 2’s being known by me. Aquinas 
had broader systematic reasons to deny the real relational property, spe-
cifically a doctrine of divine simplicity which required this. Those without 
such commitments are free not to make that move.
Now relational properties are one thing, relations another. Suppose one 
can’t reduce facts about relations to facts about relational properties, and 
consider the relation that obtains between 1 and 2 when I learn about 2. 
The relation obtains if and only if (so to speak) it has feet in both Times. 
So if there were a 2-time and a 1-time when it began to obtain, the 2-time 
would be when in 2 it began to obtain in 1. The 2- and 1-times would be 
simultaneous. So the relation cannot begin to obtain if the Times are dis-
crete.47 One might reply here that the Times were discrete, but my learning 
about 2 ended that. This is however massively implausible. Suppose that a 
baby universe pinches off from our spacetime and a physicist learns about 
that. The physicist’s thoughts cannot reconnect the spacetimes. My own 
thoughts are no more powerful. So if Times are ever discrete, learning 
about this can’t change it. And so again, the relation cannot begin to ob-
tain. But before I was born, there cannot have been a relation between me 
and 2. If there was not, and there cannot come to be one, then in this sort 
of case, there cannot be relations, though there can be relational proposi-
tions made true by things’ relational properties. Again, this does not rule 
out atemporal causal relations between God and a Time. If a relation is 
atemporal, it cannot begin or cease to obtain; beginning or ceasing would 
imply that it is temporal.
Quantification
On temporal presentism, 1’s most inclusive temporal domain of quan-
tification always contains just items then present in 1. But if DT, in 1, 
everything in 2 EXISTS. So if DT, in 1, there are truths about items not 
in the most inclusive temporal domain. For temporal presentists, this is 
just business as usual. As noted earlier, most of them have allowed some 
atemporal reality. Further, temporal presentists know that Caesar is dead, 
this truth is about Caesar, and he is not in the presentist’s most inclusive 
temporal domain. Presentists need to make sense of this without letting 
Caesar creep back via the meta-language, and to provide adequate seman-
tics and truthmakers for past truth generally. But I need not do so here. If 
presentists can’t allow that “Caesar is dead” is about Caesar, that is a large 
problem for presentism. It is surely less problem for presentism to have 
truths about items not in the most inclusive temporal domain than not 
to have truths about Caesar. If presentists let “Caesar is dead” be about 
Caesar, it is no problem that on DT, there are truths about items not in the 
most inclusive temporal domain.
46Summa Theologiae Ia 13, 7.
47For like reasons, such relations can’t cease to obtain.
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On temporal presentism, 1’s most inclusive domain simpliciter includes 
what EXISTS, not just what exists. If God is timeless, God EXISTS. So on 
temporal presentism, our simpliciter most inclusive domain includes a 
timeless God, if there is one. On temporal presentism, this is fine, or so I’ve 
argued. But while our most inclusive domain includes items that EXIST, if 
there be such, it does not include Caesar. For Caesar does not EXIST. This 
might seem ad hoc, or a trick of my definitions. If God is atemporal, it is 
now true that timelessly, God sees Caesar. If God is in the domain, why 
not things which are there for Him to see? Well, being seen does not entail 
existing: the finite speed of light provides counter-examples. If it does not 
entail existing, it does not entail existing for someone other than the one 
doing the seeing. Further, Putnam’s argument from special relativity to 
the equal reality of past, present and future teaches presentists that “ex-
isting for” is not transitive.48 If a rocket travelling very fast passes just over 
someone at rest relative to the earth, on STR, some things in one’s future 
are present for the other. So if we conjoin presentism with STR—there are 
ways to do so49—January 1, 2302 (say) exists for someone in the rocket, 
and the rocket exists for the person at rest, but 2302 does not exist for the 
person at rest. The transitivity of “exists for” is the only reason to think 
things real for a timeless God have to be in 1’s most inclusive domain, and 
presentists can’t endorse that transitivity for reasons quite independent of 
DA and DT.
If temporal presentism and DA hold, what is in the most inclusive do-
main of quantification depends on location: for God it includes objects in 
our future, for us it does not, even as for those in 1, future2 objects EXIST, 
but in 2 they do not EXIST. For presentism, this is nothing outré. Any pre-
sentist who believes that objects come or cease to be accepts that what 
is in the most inclusive domain depends on one’s temporal location. For 
standard presentisms, there are, were and will be as many equally ulti-
mate ways things are as there are, were and will be present times. If we 
add DA, there are, were, will be and ARE (this last for God’s atemporal 
location) as many equally ultimate ways things are as there are, were, will 
be and ARE present times or atemporal locations. On neither standard 
presentisms nor presentism plus DA are there differing most inclusive 
domains or ultimate ways things are at once.
Morals
An atemporal God would relate to our Time as a second Time would. So 
if DT is compatible with temporal presentism, so is DA. For an atemporal 
God, then, our Time exists without tense, as it would for a second Time. 
Yet it is internally presentist. It’s just that its tense is not real externally, 
i.e., from God’s standpoint. One might wonder whether DT yields neither 
presentism nor eternalism, but a sort of tertium quid, in which presentism 
48Putnam, “Time and Physical Geometry,” 240–247.
49See, e.g., Zimmerman, “Presentism and the Space-Time Manifold,” 163–246.
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about 1 is right in 1 and eternalism about 1 is right in 2.50 I think not; if 
I’ve defined presentism properly, then if presentism is the truth about 2, 
those in 2 should think 1 is presentist too. It’s just that from 2, 1 has to look 
eternalist.51
Oriel College, University of Oxford
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